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Over the last decade China has actively pursued its 
interests in Central Asia.  With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, the present countries of Central Asia 
established independent rule.  With Soviet control removed, 
social and international problems that were hidden and 
suppressed began to show themselves throughout the region.  
Seeing the power vacuum, the negative effects of smuggling, 
separatism and terrorism associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism, and the effect these issues could have on 
China, Beijing decided to take steps to help address these 
concerns in Central Asia 
Currently the United States is spearheading a war on 
terrorism, focusing on countries close to Central Asia such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq.  If the United States plans on 
staying in the region, it must take into account the forces 
shaping Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia.  
Possibilities exist for cooperation, but if the situation 
is misinterpreted or handled incorrectly, there is also a 
possibility for conflict.  This thesis examines Chinese 
interests in Central Asia, comparing and contrasting them 
with U.S. interests in the region.  It then recommends 
policy options the United States could implement to enable 
the United States and China to move towards common goals in 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade China has expanded its foreign 
relations in areas that it previously did not have a large 
presence.  One area that China is now looking at is Central 
Asia.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
countries of Central Asia were liberated from Soviet rule.  
With Soviet control removed, social and international 
problems which were hidden and suppressed during the Soviet 
administration began to show themselves throughout the 
region.  Because of the resulting power vacuum, the 
negative effects of smuggling, separatism and terrorism 
associated with Islamic fundamentalism, and the effect 
these issues could have on China’s bordering Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region, Beijing decided to take steps to help 
curb this activity in Central Asia.   
In April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan formed a “security alliance” known as the 
Shanghai Five.  Its purpose was to promote military 
cooperation and confidence building in the border areas of 
the member states.  In 1997 the group met and signed an 
agreement to reduce the number of military forces stationed 
at the border areas to acceptable levels in keeping with 
border stability.  In 2001, the organization invited 
Uzbekistan to join and formally renamed their organization 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  In June 2002, 
the SCO signed its official charter, with provisions 
stating that it would promote cooperation in politics, 
economic trade, cultural education, energy, transportation, 
and ecological issues among its member states.  In August 
2003, SCO members conducted a joint military training 
2 
exercise known as “Coalition 2003” in the border areas of 
Kazakhstan and China.  In June 2004, it established an 
antiterrorism training center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.1 
 Prior to 9-11, U.S. objectives in Central Asia were 
to support the economic and political independence of 
Central Asia and promote regional reconciliation, 
cooperation, and economic development (as outlined in the 
10 March 1999 Congress affirmed Silk Road Strategy Act).2 
However, the events of 9-11 changed those priorities.  
Currently, the United States is spear-heading a war on 
terrorism, focusing on countries close to Central Asia such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq.  This war has led to a strong U.S. 
military presence in both the Middle East and Central Asia.  
With ongoing conflicts occurring in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq, there is no clear timetable for a U.S. withdrawal 
from the region.  
If the United States plans on staying in the region, 
as it currently looks like it will, it must take a more 
proactive stance in the region.  As it appears now, the 
United States and China have several goals in common.  Both 
want stability in the region and both are actively 
targeting terrorism.  The prospects exist for China and the 
United States to enhance their political relationship and 
find ways to work together in the region, but in order for 
the United States to do so it must take into account what 
China’s goals are in Central Asia.  How both countries will 
interact in the face of similar and competing interests is 
the question that must be addressed, as there is no clear 
                     
1 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. 
Security Interest in Central Asia Reassessed,” (Strategic Studies 
Institute, Army Staff War College, 2004), 29. 
2 Wishnick, “Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia,” 
(Strategic Studies Institute, Army Staff War College, 2002), 5. 
3 
consensus on the issue.  The possibility of cooperation 
exists, but if the situation is handled incorrectly or is 
misinterpreted, there is also a possibility for conflict.  
In order to avoid possible conflict one must take a hard 
look at the Chinese historical presence in the area, look 
at China’s national interests in Central Asia, look at the 
international relationships China has formed there, and 
then compare them with U.S. interests in the region.  This 
thesis examines all of these factors and recommends policy 
options the United States could implement that would enable 
the United States and China to move towards common goals in 
Central Asia.  These common goals, in turn, may help the 
region to become more stable and in the end further U.S. 




































II. CHINESE HISTORICAL PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA 
China’s relationship with Central Asia goes back to 
the Chinese Han Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D).  China’s 
first inroads into the area were a result of trade with the 
Roman Empire and Central Asian peoples along the Silk Road.  
During this period, the Han encountered the Xiongnu, a 
people with ties to the Turkic speaking Huns.  During the 
initial stages of the foundation of the Han, the Xiongnu 
tribes placed considerable pressure on the western Han 
border areas, limiting China’s presence in Central Asia.  
However, as the Han Empire’s power grew, it eventually 
expanding into Xiongnu lands where it established dominance 
over the Silk Road Route and the Xiongnu tribes.  
Unfortunately for China, its inroads into this area were 
short lived after the dynasty was threatened by internal 
conflict.  This in turn caused the Han Dynasty to withdraw 
from Central Asia in 220 A.D. 3 
Expansion into Central Asia did not occur again until 
the Tang Dynasty (617 – 906), following the reunification 
of China under the Sui.  During this period large numbers 
of envoys, merchants, and pilgrims traveled to Changan (the 
Tang capital) from the west.  Under the Tang, the Chinese 
expanded their influence as far west as Kabul and Kashmir, 
eventually coming into contact with the Muslim peoples of 
greater Turkistan.  However, the Tang’s expansionism was 
halted as its military met up with a coalition force of 
Arab, Tibetan, and Uyghur tribes and was defeated.  Due to 
this defeat China was forced out of Central Asia and the 
                     
 3 Lyman Miller, “Qin Unification & the Han Imperium,” (Class Handout 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in October, 2004). 
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Arabs were able to expand their influence into the region 
and the major trading routes throughout the area.4 
Chinese expansion in Central Asia did not occur again 
until the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) under its Manchu rulers.  
After having conquered Taiwan and Tibet, the Qing moved to 
reestablish control over Chinese Central Asia (modern day 
Xinjiang) in 1757.  After a series of major campaigns the 
Qing defeated the Dzungar Mongols and Uyghurs, establishing 
informal rule over the region.  During this period of 
expansionism the Qing also came into contact with the 
Russians.  Both empires met each other on the battlefield 
on several occasions, but the last major confrontation 
occurred in the period 1871 – 1881, when the Russians moved 
into the Ili region.  By the late 1870s the Qing was able 
to reclaiming control of this area and pressured the 
Russians to withdraw.  A formal settlement was reached in 
the signing the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881, by which 
the Russian ceded control over the region to the Qing.  
Three years after the treaties signing in 1884, the area 
was formally designated the Xinjiang administrative region.5   
In 1911, the Qing dynasty collapsed and with its 
collapse China lost control over this border region.  From 
1911 to 1944, Xinjiang was ruled by various local tribes 
living in the area.  In 1944 this changed when these tribes 
banded together and formed the Republic of East Turkistan.  
However, this independent state was short-lived, when the 
                     
 4 Bates Gill, “China’s New Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in 
Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests,” (Washington D.C.: 
CSIS Press, 2003), 3-4. 
 5 Frederick Starr, Xinjiang, China’s Muslim Borderland (Armok, New 
York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 61-62. 
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newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC) moved into 
the region and reestablished military control over it.6 
Following the formation of the PRC in 1949, China 
relied heavily on its benefactor the Soviet Union, 
establishing extensive ties with Moscow.  By 1962 this 
relationship had deteriorated, as the two countries that 
were once friends became adversaries (within the Marxist 
camp) in the larger Cold War between the West and the 
Soviet Union. 
On several occasions during the Cold War period, 
China’s border area with the USSR came into conflict and 
serious military incidents occurred, almost bringing both 
nations to war in 1969.  Based on this adversarial 
relationship the border areas of western China were closed 
off and relations between Central Asia (under the control 
of the Soviet Union) and China were virtually ended.  By 
the late 1980s a cooling off of hostilities between the two 
nations led to a renovation of friendly relations in 1989 
during a Sino-Soviet summit in Beijing.  During the initial 
Soviet visit to Beijing and a reciprocal Chinese visit to 
Moscow, the two countries issued two communiqués outlining 
the following points in their future relations: 
 
1) Future relations would be based on the “five 
principles of peaceful coexistence”; 
2) Disputes would be resolved peacefully without 
the threat or use of force; 
3) Talks would begin to settle outstanding border 
issues, cut military forces, and establish 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) along their 
shared border; 
4) Economic trade and cultural and scientific 
exchanges would be expanded;                      
 6 Gill, 4. 
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5) Moscow would support Beijing’s position on 
Taiwan; and 
6) The two nations would work toward the creation 
of a new international political order.7 
 
In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the countries 
of Central Asia were liberated from Soviet rule.  With 
Soviet control removed from Central Asia, social and 
international problems that were suppressed under the 
Soviet administration began to show themselves throughout 
the region.  Seeing the power vacuum, the negative effects 
of smuggling, separatism and terrorism associated with 
Islamic fundamentalism, and the effect these issues could 
have on China’s bordering Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 
Beijing decided to take steps to help curb this activity in 
Central Asia.8   
In April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan formed a “security alliance” known as the 
Shanghai Five.  Its purpose was to promote military 
cooperation and confidence building in the border areas of 
the member states.  In 1997 the group met and signed an 
agreement to reduce the number of military forces stationed 
in the border areas to reasonable defensive levels only.  
In 2001, the organization invited Uzbekistan to join, and 
the organization was formally renamed the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO).9  In June 2002, the SCO 
signed its initial charter, with provisions stating that it 
would effect cooperation in politics, economic trade, 
                     
 7 Gill, 5. 
 8 Gill, 5-6. 
 9 Wishnick, “Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security 
Interest in Central Asia Reassessed” (Strategic Studies Institute, Army 
Staff War College, 2004), 29. 
9 
cultural education, energy, transportation, and ecological 
issues among its member states.  The charter also addressed 
security concerns, establishing a means of cooperation in 
its fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism.10 
To build on the SCO’s call for cooperation in its 
fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, China 
and Kyrgyzstan held a joint counterterrorism exercise in 
Kyrgyzstan in October 2002--the first of its kind.  The 
following year in August 2003, the SCO followed up with a 
larger joint military/counter-terrorism training exercise 
called “Coalition 2003,” holding it in the border areas of 
Kazakhstan and China.  Most recently, in January 2004, the 
SCO established an anti-terrorist center, headquartered in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan.11 
On 12 April 2005, The SCO signed a memorandum of 
understanding between the SCO and the Executive Committee 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  Shortly 
thereafter, on 25 April 2005, it signed a second memorandum 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
These memorandums established a basis and method of 
cooperation between the SCO and these organizations in 
areas of counterterrorism, economics and trade, humanistic 
and cultural areas, and other mutually beneficial fields.12 
On 5 July 2005, the SCO met in Astana, Kazakhstan and 
issued a joint declaration.  In the declaration the SCO 
                     
 10 “The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (RATS SCO),” Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure Website, 
available at http://www.ecrats.com 
 11 Gill, 5-6. 
 12 Valeriy Agarkov, “Russia Hails Beginning of Official Contacts 
Between SCO and ASEAN,” ITAR-TASS, 25 April 2005, available at 
http://www.fbis.gov and Ron Yan, “SCO and CIS Sign MOU on Cooperation 
in Counterterrorism, Others,” Xinhua Chinese, 12 April 2005, available 
from http://wwww.fbis.com 
10 
extended observer status to Pakistan, Iran and India, 
indicating its willingness to allow these states to join 
the organization at some point in the future.  It also made 
a public declaration, calling on the United States to set a 
final timeline for the use of its military bases in Central 
Asia.  The declaration indicated that, due to the apparent 
drawdown of the active military stage of antiterrorist 
operations in Afghanistan, the United States should now 












                     
 13 “Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation 




III. CHINESE NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
China’s modern history has been filled with one 
conflict or crisis after another.  It is a county 
surrounded by past enemies and potential future 
adversaries.  To the northeast, China faces a threat of a 
potential war on the Korean Peninsula.  To the east, China 
faces a past and potential military and economic threat in 
Japan.  To the southeast, China faces a potential all-out 
war with Taiwan and the United States.  Further to the 
southeast, China faces potential conflicts with Vietnam and 
other Southeast Asian states over sovereignty rights in the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands.  To the southwest, China faces 
a growing economic rival in India whom it fought in the 
past.  To the west, China faces potential separatist and 
instability issues with the Central Asian states.  To the 
north, China faces a potentially strong Russian military 
threat if the countries relations sour as they did in the 
past.  Finally, on all sides, China faces a perceived soft 
containment policy by the United States that is spreading 
its influence throughout Asia as it conducts its war on 
terror.   
The PRC’s perceptions of the international security 
environment mold its national interests.  China is the 
world’s most populous country with the world’s largest 
military.  Since its inception it has been threatened by 
powers much greater than itself.  The two largest threats 
to its sovereignty were the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  From 1949 – 1991, China has allied itself with one 
power or the other in order to balance against whichever 
power was stronger at the time.  Beijing felt that in order 
12 
to keep the world a stable place there had to be a balance 
of power in the international environment.  This balance 
changed in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed.  With its 
collapse, the United States was the sole remaining 
superpower and Beijing no longer had any one power it could 
balance with against the United States.   
Since 1991, China has maneuvered in the international 
arena to utilize multinational organizations to balance 
against the power of the United States, the largest of 
which is the United Nations (U.N.).  China believes that 
the best way to limit U.S. power is to utilize the U.N. 
against the United States and to join and create regional 
organizations that limit United States involvement in the 
specific areas where the organizations operate. 
To counter and influence the perceived U.S. threat, 
Beijing has joined several international organizations that 
strengthen China’s regional position and lessen the United 
States’ influence.  Examples of such organizations and 
agreements are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the 2003 Joint 
Declaration of the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation 
among the PRC, Japan and the ROK.   
For China, the largest potential threat to China and 
its sovereignty is the “separatist activities” of “Taiwan 
independence” forces.  It sees any move by Taiwan towards 
independence as the most destabilizing and largest threat 
to peace in the Asia-Pacific region.  With the possibility 
of the United States joining forces with Taiwan in a 
potential crisis with the PRC, Beijing sees the potential 
for a war that could easily engulf all of East and 
Southeast Asia. 
13 
Because the Taiwan scenario is the most likely 
destabilizing factor for China, Beijing must ensure that 
its strategic backdoor (Xinjiang Province) is safe and 
stable.  If China can ensure that it does not have to worry 
about its western borders, it can concentrate fully on 
other more pressing issues, such as its reunification with 
Taiwan and economic development.  This viewpoint is most 
readily visible in China’s 2004 White Paper on National 
Defense.  According to the White Paper, the PRC’s national 
defense goals are: 
 
1) To stop separation and promote unification, 
guard against and resist aggression, and defend 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
maritime rights and interests; 
2) To safeguard the interests of national 
development, promote economic and social 
development in an all around, coordinated and 
sustainable way and steadily increase its 
overall national strength; 
3) To modernize China’s national defense in line 
with both the national conditions of China and 
the trend of military development in the world 
by adhering to the policy of coordinating 
military and economic development, and improve 
the operational capabilities of self-defense 
under the conditions of informationalization; 
4) To safeguard the political, economic and 
cultural rights and interests of the Chinese 
people, crack down on criminal activities of 
all sorts and maintain public order and social 
stability; and 
5) To pursue an independent foreign policy of 
peace and adhere to the new security concept 
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and coordination with a view to 
securing a long-term and favorable 
international and surrounding environment.14  
                     
 14 “China’s National Defense in 2004”, Chinese White Paper, 
14 
Based on these national defense goals it can be argued 
that China is guided by four principal interests when it 
comes to Central Asia.  These interests are:  strategic and 
diplomatic interests; national security interests; 
demarcation, demilitarization, stabilization of its borders 
with Central Asia; and economic and trade interests.   
 
A. STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC INTERESTS  
China’s overarching goals for Central Asia entail the 
establishment of a more peaceful and constructive external 
environment in Central Asia.  Beijing seeks to do this by 
demonstrating its great power responsibility through 
diplomatic means.  These consist of initiating bilateral 
and multilateral regional relationships that will foster a 
more peaceful environment and lead to better relations 
between Central Asian states and China.  When looking for 
the historical precedents for this action in the area, one 
only has to look back to the treaty established between 
Russia and China in 1989.  For Beijing it became a template 
treaty for its various bilateral and multilateral Central 
Asian treaties following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991. 
The guiding principles established in China’s treaty 
with Russia, as well as with other treaties it has 
established with other neighboring states over the previous 
50 years, are its emphasis on the Five Principals of 
Peaceful Coexistence.  These principles are: 
 
1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; 
2) Mutual non-aggression;                      
available at http://www.china.org.cn 
15 
3) Mutual non-interference in their respective 
domestic affairs; 
4) Mutual benefit; and 
5) Peaceful coexistence.15 
 
These guiding principles were prominent in the 
formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 
2001 between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  According to the founding 
declaration, the main goals of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization are: 
 
1) Strengthening mutual trust and good-   
neighborliness and friendship among member   
states; 
2) Developing their effective cooperation in    
political affairs, the economy and trade,   
science and technology, culture, education, 
energy, transportation, environmental 
protection and other fields; 
3) Working together to maintain regional peace,   
security and stability; and 
4) Promoting the creation of a new international   
political and economic order featuring   
democracy, justice and rationality.16 
 
The formation of the SCO enabled China to have an 
active role in Central Asia where it did not have one 
before.  In addition, in view of Beijing’s overall 
strategic interests, the SCO allowed China to have a major 
                     
 15 Zhou Qingchang, “Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership,” Beijing 
Review, 1989, available at http://www.china.org.cn 
 16 “Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2004/01/07,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Peoples Republic of China, 7 January 2004, 
available at http://www.fmprce.gov.cn 
16 
say in regional politics while limiting its largest 
competitor’s action in Central Asia--the United States.   
In the geopolitical arena, China is concerned about 
the U.S. presence in the region and its possible motive to 
dominate the area.  Since shortly after 9-11, the United 
States has had a strong military presence in the region in 
pursuit of its war on terror.  Initially, the U.S. presence 
was a welcome force thanks to the success of its war on 
terror in Afghanistan.  This success led to the decimation 
of pan-Turkic and Islamic insurgent groups operating in the 
region and forced the remnants of these groups into 
hiding.17  For China, the U.S.-led war produced greater 
security and stability in the region and, as such, 
benefited China.  
Recent events in Central Asia have now changed this 
perception and have caused Beijing to reevaluate its view 
of the U.S. presence in the region.  The two events that 
changed this perception were the Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, and the Andijan Riots in 
Uzbekistan in May 2005.18  In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the 
sudden removal of its president by the Kyrgyz people led to 
speculation by Beijing that the United States may have been 
somehow behind the move in order to put in place a 
government that was friendlier towards the United States.  
In the case of Uzbekistan, China suspected that the United 
States had changed its policy in Central Asia from one 
                     
 17 Chien-Peng Chung, “The Defense of Xinjiang,” Harvard 
International Review, (Cambridge: Summer 2003, Vol. 25, Iss. 2), 58. 
 18 See Chapter IV under Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for further 
details. 
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geared toward anti-terrorism to one that now espouses 
democratic reform and “colored” revolutions.19   
Based on this apparent shift in U.S. policy in Central 
Asia, China helped sponsor a joint declaration by the SCO 
on 5 July 2005, in which the SCO requested that the United 
States set a final timeline for the use of its military 
bases in Central Asia.20  Looking at the overall 
geopolitical landscape, it now appears that China has 
solidified its leadership role in the region, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally.21  However, even with these 
diplomatic achievements China will not be content with the 
status quo and will continue to build on both its bilateral 
and multilateral relationships in the region.  For China 
this region is its strategic backyard, and it will be ever 
vigilant to ensure that the region remains aligned with 
China. 
 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS 
China’s largest concern in Central Asia is its 
national security interests in the area, particularly 
Beijing’s fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism 
(also known as the “three evils”).22  In this fight, it is 
predominantly concerned with the separatist movements 
targeting the Chinese government in Xinjiang Autonomous 
region.  Since the region officially became part of the 
                     
 19 See Chapter IV under Uzbekistan for further details. 
 20 “Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation 
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 21 See Chapter IV for further details on China’s bilateral 
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PRC, it has had security concerns in the region due to the 
large presence of non-Han Chinese in the area, consisting 
mainly of Turkic (Uyghurs) and Moslem peoples.  Together 
these groups constitute the majority in the region and are 
only held in check by the PRC’s firm grip in the area.  
Since the 1950s, China has utilized its historical approach 
of bringing areas of China under its control by encouraging 
migration of its Han population into the exterior areas of 
China.  This method has worked successfully in Xinjiang, 
but at the same time has alienated the native population in 
the area.   
In conjunction with internal instability, the rise of 
the Central Asian states in 1991 has also caused China much 
concern.  What the peoples of Xinjiang saw was the rise of 
states based loosely on ethnic population groups--states 
numbering much less than the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.  
This nationalization along ethnic lines has only reinforced 
the separatist movements in Xinjiang.  Besides this 
domestic issue, these separatist movements are increasingly 
taking on transnational aspects as well.  External Uyghur 
support is being funneled into China from Central Asia.  
This increased funding and activity has been reflected in 
terrorist activities, such as the bombings of various 
Chinese governmental organizations in Xinjiang, as well as 
Beijing, between 1997 and the present.  In 1997 alone, 
these attacks led to more than 40 small uprisings in 
Xinjiang and led to a crackdown on the Uyghur population, 
resulting in the death of 80, the injury of over 200, and 
the arrest of nearly 800 Uyghurs.23 
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Outside of China, terrorist attacks have been on the 
rise against the Chinese in Central Asia as well, and there 
are indications that the popular East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) in China has established ties to other 
terrorist organizations operating out of Central Asia.  For 
example, in March 2000, a group of four Uyghur operatives 
targeted and killed the head of the Uyghur cultural society 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan for not providing sufficient 
financial assistance.  They also ambushed a Chinese 
delegation in Bishkek, killing an ethnic Uyghur and 
injuring a Han Chinese official.24  What these attacks 
demonstrated to China was that the terrorist issue was not 
only a Chinese issue, rather a Central Asian issue as well. 
To address its national interests, China has been 
successfully able to utilize the SCO.  As part of the SCO’s 
charter, the fight against the “three evil forces” was 
incorporated into the document.  To reinforce this 
cooperation, two joint anti-terrorism military exercise 
have been conducted--one between China and Kyrgyzstan in 
October 2002, and a second between SCO member states in the 
Kazakhstan and Chinese border area in Aug 2003.25  To 
further develop cooperation, the SCO established a counter-
terrorism center in January 2004, headquartering it in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan.  By finding common interest items 
that could easily undermine any of the Central Asian states 
authority, China was able to find the critical common 
ground that enhanced China’s overall standing in Central 
Asia.  In this case the issue is the region’s war against 
terrorism, separatism and extremism. 
                     
 24 “Kyrgyzstan, Pleasing China, Sentences Uyghurs for Terrorism,” 
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C. SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES 
An area that has affected China since 1991 is the 
status of its shared borders with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan.  These conflicts were first addressed by 
China and the previous respective states during the initial 
establishment of the Shanghai Five in 1996.  At the time, 
China recognized the greater importance of regional 
security and decided to place the status of their shared 
borders on hold.  To settle the security issue, the 
Shanghai Five agreement decreased each country’s military 
border forces to defensible limits only in an area 
extending 100 kilometers from each of the countries’ 
borders.26  The reason for this demarcation and 
demilitarization of the borders was that it allowed each of 
the countries concerned to go beyond the past threat of 
military confrontation and to move on to other concerns 
such as diplomatic issues, internal political problems, 
other threats to internal state national security, and to 
allow for more productive cross border trade.27 Since then, 
bilateral talks have been held, resulting in the border 
dispute between China and the three Central Asian states 
being resolved.28  With these border issues officially 
settled China is now able to concentrate its efforts on its 
other national interest items. 
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D. ENERGY AND TRADE INTERESTS 
An area of growing importance, and arguably China’s 
most important interest in Central Asia, is access to 
natural resources from the region.  China’s growing need 
for resources is demonstrated in its rating as the world’s 
number two primary energy consumer, second only to the 
United States.29  Due to this interest China has expanded 
its political and economic interests in countries all over 
the globe that can help fulfill its energy requirements.  
 Currently, China derives 40 percent of its imported 
oil from the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia.  Four-
fifths of these oil imports travel through waterways 
traversing Southeast Asia and the Malacca Strait.30  For 
Beijing, if a major power were to disrupt this waterway, 
China would be severely impacted both economically and 
politically.  To address this issue, China recognizes that 
it must find land-based routes to obtain its natural 
resources, routes that can only be established through 
Russia and Central Asia.  In the case of Russia, the 
majority of the routes have already established; leaving 
Central Asia as the last remaining best option that will 
answer China’s growing energy demands.  Currently, China 
only imports oil from Kazakhstan, accounting for less than 
one percent of Chinese imports.  However, this will change 
as China has completed an agreement with Kazakhstan to 
complete a 3,000 Km oil pipeline to China’s Xinjiang 
Autonomous region by the end of 2005.31 
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In addition to natural resources, China also has local 
trade interests with the countries of Central Asia.  
China’s Xinjiang province is quickly becoming China’s most 
important trading region outside of China’s coastal 
regions, and the potential trade growth for the area is 
tremendous.  To help the area grow, trade must flourish.  
Central Asia is quickly becoming a conduit through which 
China can obtain commodities and raw materials, such as 
iron ore, steel, copper and nonferrous metals that can help 
upgrade its power and telecommunications grid in Xinjiang.  
In return, China provides low-cost goods to Central Asia.  
Additionally, as Central Asia develops, the countries of 
Central Asia are becoming investment opportunities for 
China to move into.32  This mutual trade demonstrates a 
growing interdependence, furthering China’s overall goals 
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IV. BILATERAL SINO-CENTRAL ASIAN RELATIONSHIPS 
A. KAZAKHSTAN 
China strongest relationship in Central Asia is its 
relationship with Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan shares a 1533 
kilometer border with China and China’s historical concern 
has been over destabilizing factors in Kazakhstan that 
could lead to destabilization in China’s neighboring 
Xinjiang province.  Within the framework of the SCO the 
border areas have been demarked and relations between both 
countries have improved measurably.  With security and 
border issues addressed, Kazakhstan is now able to provide 
for China’s remaining interest in Central Asia, its 
interest in energy and trade. 
On 28 June 2005, an aide of Chinese Foreign Minister 
Li Huei stated that the cooperation between China and 
Kazakhstan in the energy sphere “has reached the most 
important of positions” in bilateral relations.  He 
continued that it is of “strategic importance” for both 
China and Kazakhstan and that there are “many 
possibilities” for broadening bilateral relation in the 
energy sphere to the mutual benefit of both countries.33  
What he was referring to was the Atsu-Alashankou oil 
pipeline that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 
2005.  The pipeline will be the first between China and 
Kazakhstan and will transport approximately 10 million tons 
of oil a year, with plans to bring the capacity up to 30 
million tons.   
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At present, oil is shipped via rail and accounts for 
less than one percent of Chinese oil imports.  However, 
this pipeline will satisfy approximately ten percent of 
China’s oil needs and will provide China with a long-term 
and stable energy supply, thereby reducing its energy risk 
in the international market. 34  To facilitate this influx 
of oil, China is constructing a large oil refinery in 
Xinjiang.  This refinery is part of the two countries’ 
strategic cooperation plans that call for China and 
Kazakhstan to jointly utilize a total of 20 sets of oil-
refining facilities and 12 sets of petrochemical 
equipment.35  
Besides oil, China considers trade its next most 
important economic interest in Kazakhstan. Some experts 
point to this trade as of minimal importance because it 
only accounts for 0.4 percent of overall Chinese foreign 
trade.36  However, Xinjiang Province’s figures reveal a much 
different picture.  Instead, one sees that the overall 
trade between Central Asia and China accounts for 60 
percent of the volume of Xinjiang’s foreign trade, equaling 
four billion dollars in 2003.37  Additionally, among the 
countries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is China’s largest 
trading partner.   
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China’s “Go West” trade policy with Central Asia is 
extremely important.  If China can improve the livelihood 
of Xinjiang’s population through increased trade in the 
economic sector, it will likely lesson the tensions between 
China’s central government and the region’s people.  In so 
doing, these lesser tensions will help China stabilize the 
region so that it can extract the resources it needs from 
both Xinjiang and Central Asia, and also allow China to 
concentrate on other more important issues, such as its 
overall economic development. 
In 2003, total trade between China and Kazakhstan 
amounted to 2.856 billion dollars, with Kazakhstan exports 
amounting to 1.31 billion dollars and Chinese exports 
amounting to 1.546 billion dollars.  Of Kazakhstan exports, 
over 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports were attributable 
to raw materials; 58 percent from energy and 24 percent 
from ferrous and non-ferrous metals. In China’s case, 
exports were attributable to engineering and metalworking 
production (approximately 69 percent), foodstuffs 
(approximately 9 percent) and the reminder consisted of 
other goods (such as textiles).38 
Today, 10 out of 16 land ports in Xinjiang are 
authorized by the Central government to conduct trade 
directly with Central Asia and an additional 11 land ports 
are authorized by local authorities to do the same.  Of 
this trade, in 2004, Kazakhstan transported 9.2 million 
tones of cargo by rail to and from China and plans to 
increase the amount to 20 million tons by 2010.39 
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Prior to September 2005, Xinjiang had 15 highway 
transportation ports and 63 international passenger and 
cargo transportation routes connecting both countries.  
Recent construction projects increased this number when 
China and Kazakhstan launched an additional 12 
transportation routes between major cities in Xinjiang 
province and Kazakhstan on 1 September 05.40   
Future plans for both countries are to establish an 
“international cooperation zone” along their shared border.  
This zone would allow free trade between the two countries 
and would be a good test case for a future SCO-sponsored 
free trade zone in Central Asia.41   
For China and Kazakhstan trade is a stabilizing force.  
If both countries can keep their populations fed and 
improve their population’s economic standing through trade, 
both countries will be able to quell social unrest in their 
respective territories.  If this strategy is successful and 
unrest subsides and economic prosperity increases, it will 
demonstrate to the other members of the SCO that a free 
trade zone can work in Central Asia.  This task will not 
only help unify the SCO members, it will also move the 
countries further into China’s camp and away from other 
outward influences such as the United States.    
 
B. UZBEKISTAN 
Uzbekistan and China have until recently had minimal 
relations due to Uzbekistan’s alignment with both Russia 
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and the United States, and because the two countries do not 
share a common border.  Uzbekistan permitted the 
establishment of a U.S. base on its soil and as such 
demonstrated Uzbekistan’s closer relations with the United 
States.  However, to say the relationship between China and 
Uzbekistan was non-existent would be incorrect.  Through 
the SCO, China has been able to have relations with 
Uzbekistan, specifically in areas of security. 
On the economic front, Uzbekistan has favored its 
trade with the other Central Asian states and Russia, 
blocking many Chinese exports into the country.  This was 
due to the fairly harsh protectionist strategy it employed 
to protect its internal economy from cheap Chinese goods.42 
Even with this protectionist strategy, trade still 
occurs but on a limited scale.  In 2003, total trade 
between the two countries amounted to 216 million dollars, 
with Uzbekistan’s exports amounting to 52 million dollars 
and China’s exports amounting to 164 million dollars.  Of 
this total trade, Uzbekistan’s exports to China included 
services (48 percent), machinery and equipment (19 
percent), cotton (4 percent), foodstuffs (4.6 percent) and 
non-ferrous metals (1.5 percent).  China’s exports included 
engineering products (48 percent), chemical products (19%) 
and foodstuffs (9%); accounting for 0.03 percent of China’s 
total trade.43 
On 25 May 2005, Uzbekistan’s relationship changed 
significantly with China when Uzbekistan President Karimov 
met with State President of the PRC Hu Jintao in Beijing.  
This was an historic meeting in which China openly 
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supported Uzbekistan’s handling of its 13 May 2005, Andijan 
riots.  Hu Jintao indicated that he “respected the path 
chosen by the Uzbek people in line with its national 
condition” and their “efforts to safeguard national 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”  At 
the conclusion of the meeting, the two countries signed 
their first “Treaty of Friendly and Cooperative 
Partnership.”  The treaty focused on promoting cooperation 
in priority fields such as oil and gas, mining, 
telecommunications, communications and infrastructure.44  
On 25 July 2005, after having been told that the 
United States would likely cut one-third of the $60 million 
aid package to Uzbekistan for the year, Uzbekistan 
announced that China planned on investing 600 million 
dollars in its oil and gas sector, with the total package 
(including framework contracts) having an estimated worth 
of almost $1.5 billion.  The proposal outlined 50 projects 
in information technology, mechanical and engineering, 
chemical and electromechanical industries, manufacturing of 
construction material, and furniture and goods.  Of this 
amount, China has promised to allocate more than 434.2 
million dollars in direct financial resources.45 
On 30 July 2005, Uzbekistan notified the United States 
that U.S. forces would be evicted from Khanabad air base 
and that it had 180 days to move its aircraft, personnel 
and military equipment from the base.  This decision was 
based on two main factors.  The first factor was the U.S. 
perception that Uzbekistan had violently suppressed 
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demonstrations on 13 May 2005 in Andijan in which hundreds 
of people were believed to have died.  The second factor 
was the decision by the United Nations and United States to 
evacuate 440 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania--
refugees that Uzbekistan considered terrorists and 
criminals.46  In retaliation, Uzbekistan called for the 
United States to close its base and move its equipment and 
forces out within 180 days. 
Based on the breakdown in ties between the United 
States and Uzbekistan, it appears that Uzbekistan has found 
a more willing and supportive partner in China.  China has 
stated publicly that it supports Uzbekistan’s handling of 
its own internal domestic problems, something it posits in 
all of its bilateral treaties. This burgeoning relationship 
should help China improve its relationship with not only 
Uzbekistan but the other countries of Central Asia that may 
fear that the United States is supporting democratic 
revolutions within the other Central Asian states.  Due to 
the method by which it handled the Andijan incident, the 
United States has not only hurt its current relationships, 
but has also given China the necessary ammunition to 
further strengthen its own relationships in Central Asia, 
starting with Uzbekistan. 
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C. KYRGYSTAN 
China’s shares a strategic relationship with 
Kyrgyzstan because of the presence of two outside 
influences in the country--the United States with its 
military deployment of over 1000 military personnel at 
Manas Airbase, and Russia, with its Collective Security 
Organization (CSTO) Rapid Deployment Force at Kant 
Airbase.47  Due to these two outside influences and China’s 
shared 858 kilometer border with Kyrgyzstan, China must 
ensure that it maintains good relations with Kyrgyzstan.  
To do so, China has relied on common problems and has 
utilized the SCO as its voice.  An example of this was seen 
when the two countries conducted China’s first joint 
counter-terrorism exercise in the border areas of both 
countries under the auspices of the SCO.48 
When the United States first entered the region under 
operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it gained the use of Manas 
airbase in Kyrgyzstan.  It was troubling to China but at 
the same time helpful, as the base was used for anti-
terrorism missions and in so doing helped stabilize the 
region.  However, this perception changed in March 2005                      47 Sergei Blagov, “Russia drops an anchor in Central Asia,” Asia 
Times Online, 25 October 2003, available at http://www.atimes.com.  The 
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based on two events.  The first event occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, 
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Tajikistan and seized a village, taking six high profile hostages--
consisting of four Japanese geologists and a Kyrgyz major-general, 
Anarbek Shamkeyev, commander of Interior Ministry troops.  The second 
event it was based on occurred in August 2000, when Muslim rebels 
crossed into Kyrgyzstan and engaged government troops in the Batken 
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when the Tulip Revolution occurred in Kyrgyzstan and 
President Akayev was ousted from power.  China believed 
that the United States may have been somehow behind the 
move and sought to place a government that was friendlier 
towards the United States.  China was not without options, 
however, and exercised its power in the SCO on 5 July 2005, 
when the SCO (to include the new Kyrgyz President Bakyiev) 
issued a statement requesting that the United States plan 
for its departure from all of its bases in Central Asia.  
However, due to quick maneuvering by the United States, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went to the country in 
late July 2005 and was able to get assurances from 
Kyrgyzstan that it could keep its airbase there for as long 
as the Afghan war required it.  It was widely reported that 
Kyrgyzstan was forced to reconsider due to an offer by the 
United States to pay double its normal rent and to provide 
Kyrgyzstan with an interest-free loan of 200 million 
dollars (accounting to more than 60% of Kyrgyzstan’s yearly 
budget).49 
Beyond geopolitical concerns, China is interested in 
the country because it is one of the main transit routes of 
Chinese goods from Xinjiang province. In 2003, trade 
between both countries amounted to 96 million dollars.  The 
volume of Kyrgyz exports to China amounted to 23 million 
dollars (approximately 4 percent of its exports) and the 
Chinese volume amounted to 72 million dollars.  Exports to 
China included raw material for textiles (mainly leather 
and wool, 23 percent) and ferrous and non-ferrous metal 
waste (approximately 60 percent).  Exports to Kyrgyzstan 
included machinery and equipment (approximately 11 
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percent), foodstuffs and other consumer goods 
(approximately 65 percent).50 
China sees the main road from Xinjiang to the Kyrgyz 
town of Osh as the key thoroughfare for trade between the 
two countries.  Based on this fact, China and Kyrgyzstan 
have discussed attracting resources to improve the road and 
to conduct a feasibility study to build a new railway line 
between Kyrgyzstan, China and Uzbekistan.  Another key 
infrastructural improvement was a 30 million yuan repair 
project for the road between Bishkek and Manas Airport that 
the Chinese agreed to fund in February 2005.51 
China is also interested in Kyrgyzstan because of 
security concerns regarding drugs, organized crime, Islamic 
radicalism, and its links to China’s own internal 
terrorist/separatist problem with the East Turkistan 
Islamic Party (ETIM).  This organization is an Islamic 
extremist group that calls for the creation of an Islamist 
state in Xinjiang province.  The group is recognized by 
both the United States and United Nations as a terrorist 
organization and has been linked by Beijing to at least 166 
violent incidents in 2003 alone.  It has a reported 2,000 
fighters operating along the Xinjiang, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan borders.52 
Recent speculation in the news media has indicated a 
Chinese interest in building a Chinese base in Kyrgyzstan.  
Responding to this speculation, on 1 August 2005, the 
Chinese ambassador to Kyrgyzstan issued a statement that 
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denied any interest.  In his statement he said, “China’s 
foreign policy is a peaceful policy and China has never 
deployed a military base in other states.”53  Although China 
is interested in rooting out the terrorist problem in 
Central Asia, Beijing has never before sought to build a 
military base outside of its own territory.  Rather, the 
speculation might be in regards to recent reports about the 
SCO planning to set up a base in southern Kyrgyzstan.  If 
this were to come about, China may be willing to base 
military members in another’s state under the label of a 
joint anti-terrorist unit within the framework of the SCO.   
 
D. TURKMENISTAN 
Since independence, China’s influence in Turkmenistan 
has been minimal because of Turkmenistan’s international 
stance of “positive neutrality.”  This neutrality has 
limited Turkmenistan’s involvement bilaterally with China 
and explains its exclusion from multilateral groups such as 
the SCO.54  However, on 20 July 2005, this position changed 
when Turkmen President Saparmyrat Nyyazow and Chinese Vice-
Premier Wu Yi signed a historic agreement worth 24 million 
dollars.  The two parties issued a joint statement in which 
they agreed to cooperate in the oil and gas sectors, to 
cooperate in technical fields and to work together in other 
economic areas such as the textile industry.  In this 
agreement President Nyyazow made the following statement 
that indicated a significant change in Turkmenistan’s 
neutral stance and its overall view of China, “You (China) 
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are providing assistance to the development of newly 
independent states, which were part of the USSR.  And you 
do this selflessly, without putting forward any political 
or other conditions.  We are grateful to you for that, the 
most of what has been created in Turkmenistan during the 
past 13 years, have been taken from Chinese experience.”55 
Looking at this statement in conjunction with the turn 
of events in Uzbekistan, it can be seen that a significant 
shift in the geopolitical situation has occurred in Central 
Asia in China’s favor.  There are likely reasons behind 
this new bilateral agreement.  First, China is offering 
significant financial assistance to help improve 
Turkmenistan’s oil and gas sector and Turkmenistan can 
hardly afford not to take the generous financial offer.  
Like any rational state, it wants to improve its internal 
infrastructure and economic well-being to become stronger.  
Second, Turkmenistan likely feels threatened by the 
apparent U.S. support to colored revolutions in Central 
Asia.  Because of Turkmenistan’s autocratic government, 
this potential threat likely contributed to its newly 
formed relationship with China.  It now appears that 
Turkmenistan is firmly in China’s camp and, by doing so, 
China has now solidified bilateral relationships with each 
Central Asian state. 
Outside of geopolitical concerns, China sees the 
potential for long-term gains from its investments in 
Turkmenistan’s fledgling oil and gas sector.  
Diversification is the key for China, and its growing 
relationship with Turkmenistan now provides another avenue 
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for it to obtain resources.  Besides resources, China is 
also interested in foreign trade.  Overall trade between 
both countries has been rather limited, with trade between 
China and Turkmenistan being valued at 122 million dollars 
in 2003.  The volume of exports from Turkmenistan to China 
amounted to 19 million dollars while the volume of imports 
from China to Turkmenistan was valued at 103 million 
dollars.  Exports to China included main energy sources 
(approximately 83 percent), cotton, and other types of raw 
materials for textiles (approximately 5 percent).  The 
range of exports from China mainly consisted of engineering 
and metalworking production (approximately 60 percent), 
foodstuffs (15 percent) and other items (25 percent).56  
With relations improving, Turkmenistan and China will 
likely become more dependent upon each other’s market; 
thereby improving Turkmenistan’s economy and strengthening 
the ties that bind the two countries together. 
 
E. TAJIKISTAN 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s 
relationship with Tajikistan was established in 1992.  
However, this relationship was strained due to a civil war 
erupting shortly after Tajikistan declared its 
independence.  The two countries share a 434 kilometer 
border in their remote mountain border areas, and until 
recently, they have not had much cross-land contact due to 
the remoteness of the area and the lack of funds to 
maintain the roads and border checkpoints there. 
In 2002, the situation between the two countries 
changed significantly.  During the year, leaders from both                      
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countries met on several occasions, finalizing their 
relationship and signing an agreement delineating the 
borders between the two countries.  In the agreement, 
Tajikistan ceded 1,000 square kilometers of the Pamir 
mountain range to China, while China ceded 28,000 square 
kilometers to Tajikistan.57  For China, stability and 
friendly relations were more important than acquiring the 
larger amount of the remote border territory, so in order 
to move forward with bilateral relations it was willing to 
cede a larger amount of territory to Tajikistan.   
Financially, Tajikistan offers little in the way of 
trade but its location between China and Afghanistan make 
this a strategically important country for China.  China’s 
concerns are centered on illicit narcotics being smuggled 
into China through Tajikistan as well as the remote area 
being used by terrorists to move into and or provide 
support to the ETIM in Xinjiang.   
Currently, China’s relations with Tajikistan are 
growing in the economic sphere.  This is demonstrated by 
the opening of a security checkpoint at their remotest 
border, in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in west China and 
the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in east Tajikistan.  
This border checkpoint creates a route through Tajikistan 
to the heart of Central Asia and the Caspian sea area.  It 
will allow trade to flow between both countries, adding an 
additional market for Chinese goods.58  Looking at 2003 
trade data, total trade between China and Tajikistan 
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amounted to 38 million dollars.59  This low figure 
demonstrates the potential growth available to China.  With 
the road and checkpoint completed this figure should grow 
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V. THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL ASIA SINCE 1991 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
peoples of Central Asia were freed from Soviet rule and 
were left to their own devices.  When this occurred, the 
United States decided that it was in its best interest to 
limit Russian influence and to improve its overall standing 
in the region by building up bilateral relations in the 
area.   Its initial step was to recognize each of the 
countries diplomatically.  Following recognition in 1992, 
the United States focused on Kazakhstan because of concerns 
about nuclear proliferation of the remaining Soviet nuclear 
weapons still located there.60  
After settling these initial security concerns, the 
United States concentrated on its secondary interests.  
These interests were best defined in 1997 by U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott during a landmark speech 
at Johns Hopkins University.  These interests were 
fostering stability and democratization, establishing free 
market economies, sponsorship of peace and cooperation 
within and among the countries of the region and the 
integration of the countries of Central Asia with the 
larger community at large.61  Currently the policy has been 
adjusted and now adds two other key interests; establishing 
free trade and transport through the Eurasian corridor and 
ensuring Central Asia adheres to international human rights 
and standards.62  To help the Central Asian states solve 
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these issues, it supported their admission to the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program with NATO.  
What these organizations did was advance America’s national 
interests in promoting democracy, arms control, economic 
prosperity, sustainable environmental policies and 
strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  The organizations also allowed the Central Asian 
states to participate in programs bigger than themselves, 
organizations that could ultimately improve each Central 
Asian country’s way of life.63 
The United States’ next major step in the region was 
the establishment of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” of 1999.  
This act was a consolidated appropriation package that 
heightened U.S. congressional interest in Central Asia and 
provided enhanced policy attention and aid to Central Asian 
states to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian 
needs, economic development, transport and communications, 
border controls, democracy and the creation of civil 
societies in the south Caucasus and Central Asian states.64   
On 1 September 2001 the United States’ view of Central 
Asia changed considerably following the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The Bush 
Administration stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia 
now focused on three inter-related activities: the 
promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy 
development.  In June 2002, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State B. Lynn Pascoe stated that “it was critical to the 
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national interests of the United States that we greatly 
enhance our relations with the five Central Asian 
countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for 
terrorism.  In a February 2004 visit to the area, Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld announced that “it is Caspian 
security...that is important” for the United States and the 
world.65 
America’s strategy took the war against the terrorists 
to Afghanistan under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.  In order 
to deploy and support forces in the region, the United 
States needed basing locations that were close to the area.  
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were the first of the Central 
Asian states to offer their facilities to U.S. and 
coalition forces, to which Kyrgyzstan offered the use of 
Manas airport and Uzbekistan offered the use of Karshi-
Khanabad airbase.  Additional agreements were obtained to 
refuel aircraft at Dushanbe and Ashgabat airports and 
Kazakhstan provided landing rights for coalition aircraft 
forced to divert from Manas due to inclement weather or 
technical emergencies.66  In each case these military 
privileges were based on the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan 
only.  Of the two main bases, Khanabad is the larger and 
more important facility as it houses approximately 1,300 
U.S. and South Korean troops and 300 Kyrgyz civilians.  An 
additional base at Dushanbe airport in Tajikistan was 
acquired for use on a contingency basis only.  Lastly, in 
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each country over flight rights were obtained to allow for 
aircraft flying into and out of Afghanistan.67 
On 5 July 2005, a strategic turn of events occurred 
with the United States in the region.  At a press 
conference the key leaders of the SCO pronounced a joint 
declaration in which it stated that “since the military 
stage of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan 
appeared to be coming to a close, the United States should 
set a final timeline for its temporary use of the 
facilities provided to them by the Central Asian states.”68  
Due to this unexpected pronouncement, the United States 
quickly dispatched Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to 
Central Asia where he met with the leader of Kyrgyzstan, K. 
Bakiev.  Following the meeting, the United States was told 
that it could maintain its base in Kyrgyzstan for as long 
as needed for its operations in Afghanistan.69 
In another significant turn of events, on 30 July 
2005, Uzbekistan notified the United States that U.S. 
forces would be evicted from Khanabad air base and that it 
had 180 days to move its aircraft, personnel and military 
equipment from the base.  This decision was based on two 
main factors.  The first factor was the U.S. stand that 
Uzbekistan had violently suppressed demonstrations on 13 
May 2005 in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in which hundreds of 
people were believed to have died.  Uzbekistan’s stance was 
that it was suppressing extremists and terrorists who were 
a threat to the government, and the U.S. stance was that it 
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was a massacre of human life.  The second and decisive 
factor was the decision by the U.N. and United States to 
evacuate 440 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania.  
For Uzbekistan, it considered these refugees terrorists and 
criminals whom it had sovereignty rights over.70  By 
treating the terrorists as refugees, the United States had 
worn out its welcome in Uzbekistan.  In retaliation, 
Uzbekistan called for the United States to close its base 
and move its equipment and forces out within 180 days. 
                     





































VI. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
A. REGIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
According the U.S. Department of State, Central Asia 
is considered a strategically important area in U.S. 
foreign policy.  U.S. goals for the region are to see the 
development of independent, democratic and stable states 
that are committed to the kind of political and economic 
reform essential to modern societies and to integration 
into the world economy.  This overall strategy in turn is 
based on the simultaneous pursuit of three interrelated 
goals.  These goals are Central Asian security, the 
movement toward democratic policies and practices by 
Central Asian states, and the development of Central Asian 
economic potential so that it may become integrated into 
the global economy.71   
The United States has emphasized that security, 
stability and prosperity in the region is linked to 
democratic and economic reforms, a healthy respect for 
human rights, rule of law, and each states’ willingness to 
work together to solve regional problems.  To this end, the 
United States would like to see the growth of independent 
media, political pluralism and the development of a civil 
society.  Additionally, the United States believes that 
these goals can be achieved through a transition to 
democratic values and a free-market development in each 
Central Asian State.72   
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To meet U.S. security interests, Washington has moved 
forward with a military engagement strategy.  According to 
some experts, U.S. military engagement is viewed as the key 
mechanism to promote Central Asian integration into Western 
political-military institutions.  This process began in 
1993 when the first Central Asian military officials began 
to receive training at the George C. Marshall Center in 
Garmisch, Germany.  The following year all but one of the 
Central Asian states (Tajikistan) had joined NATO’s PfP 
program and between 1995 and 2001, the United States hosted 
several exercises in the United States and Europe with 
member states in order to help solidify a joint 
peacekeeping unit (among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan) with the support of CENTCOM in 1995.73   
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the 
situation in Central Asia changed drastically and the 
United States was able to use its military and political 
ties with the Central Asian states to open up forward 
basing for military use in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan (with additional access to airspace and 
restricted use of bases in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) in 
its war against terror in operation ENDURING FREEDOM.74     
The main security goal for the United States in 
Central Asia is in the area of counterterrorism and 
regional security.  These two facets are interrelated by 
concerns over regional stability in the area and the 
effects that radical Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism 
could have in destabilizing the region.  In regard to 
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counterterrorism, Central Asia is a suitable area for 
striking against terrorism.  First, it is geographically 
located in an area where known international terrorist 
organizations come from.  Second, it is a strategic 
location for launching counterterrorist operations under 
operation EDURING FREEDOM.75 
The area is home to several regional terrorist 
organizations with ties to Al Qaeda.  The most well known 
is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  The aim of 
this organization is to topple the Uzbekistan government 
and ultimately the whole of Central Asia, reforming it into 
an Islamic state.  The group is very active and has been 
involved in attacks against the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan on behalf of Osama bin Laden.76   
A second organization is the East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM), whose goal is to form an independent East 
Turkistan Islamic state comprising parts of China, Turkey, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  This 
organization is based out of China but is reported to have 
members operating in Central Asia.  The ETIM has been 
implicated in terrorist plots against U.S. interests in the 
Central Asian region, including a foiled plot to attack the 
U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan.77   
The last organization is the Hizbut Tehrir (HT).  It 
is the largest group, reportedly totaling 10,000 followers, 
and it preaches for the peaceful establishment of an 
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Islamic state throughout Central Asia.  Even though it is 
reportedly a peaceful movement, HT is reported to have a 
militant arm, with its radical followers being recruited as 
terrorists with the IMU.  HT has been implicated by 
Uzbekistan (but not by the United States) in several 
terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan in 1999 and again in 2005, 
during the Andijan riots in May.78   
 
B. CONTROL OF ENERGY RESOURCES 
Beyond simple strategic positioning, the United States 
is also interested in facilitating the exploration and 
exportation of the natural resource energy reserves in 
Central Asia so that these resources may be used in the 
world market and thus help further diversify world energy 
supplies.79  The Central Asian states have an estimated oil 
reserve of 10 billion barrels and 202 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas.  Kazakhstan accounts for two-thirds of the 
1.8 million barrels of oil exported from the area per day 
and has the potential to be one of the five top oil 
exporters by 2015.  Turkmenistan has one of the world’s 
largest deposits of natural gas, estimated at 101 trillion 
cubic feet. 80  Other energy resources in the area include 
hydro-power in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (which could 
contribute to energy needs for Central Asia, Afghanistan 
and parts of South Asia) and largely untapped oil and gas 
resources in Uzbekistan. 
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The United States has promoted the development of 
multiple export routes for the region since the majority of 
the region is landlocked.  It has contributed to the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium for shipping Kazakh oil to the 
Black Sea, and is helping in the construction of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from the Caspian to the 
Mediterranean.81   
All told, these strategic and economic interests help 
the United States’ overall geopolitical situation in the 
area by garnering support for its war against terror and 
its development of other states friendly to U.S. interests 
through financial, political and military support against 
destabilizing forces in the region.  In so doing, it 
furthers U.S. economic interests by diversifying world 
energy resources.  This diversification in turn will lead 
to greater stability in the world energy market so that 
consumers are less dependent on any one source of energy. 
 
C. STRATEGIC POSITIONING 
Looking beyond regional concerns, the United States 
has several strategic interests in the region.  
Traditionally, Central Asia has been under the control of 
the Soviet Union.  With its collapse, the United States saw 
the potential for increasing its geopolitical influence in 
the area.  However, with no historical roots in the area, 
the United States presence was seen by the Central Asian 
states as that of an outsider.  By providing both financial 
and counterterrorism assistance, the United States has been 
able to make inroads into the area.  In so doing, it now 
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deflects the traditional Russian influence and growing 
Chinese influence in the region.  
The United States was largely able to promote its 
interests by setting up bases in both Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and as a consequence, providing financial and 
counterterrorism assistance to both countries.  This has 
led to a closer relationship between all parties concerned.  
When looking at U.S. interests in Central Asia, one area 
the United States was willing to overlook (due to the War 
on Terror) was each countries’ lack of progress towards the 
U.S. goals of democratic and economic reform and each 
Central Asian states policies on human rights.  However, 
recent events have caused the United States to reassess 
this policy and with this reassessment the geopolitical 
situation in Central Asia has changed from support for the 
United States to that of toleration of its presence in the 
region.  This political shift began to change starting with 
the Tulip Revolution that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in March 
2005, in which Askar Akeyev was ousted from power by its 
people.  
At the opening of the Organization of American States 
Assembly, President Bush stated, “We come together at a 
great moment in history, when freedom is on the march 
around our world. In the last year-and-a-half -- think 
about this -- we've witnessed a Rose Revolution in Georgia, 
an Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a Purple Revolution in 
Iraq, a Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, a Cedar Revolution 
in Lebanon -- and these are just the beginnings. Across 
Central Asia, hope is stirring at the prospect of change -- 
and change will come.”82  This speech, in conjunction with 
                     
 82 “The President of the United States President George W. Busch, 
Opening of the Organization of American States Assembly,” The 
51 
the events in both Kyrgyzstan and the violent suppression 
of the protestors in May in Uzbekistan, has caused an 
apparent shift in the geopolitical situation in Central 
Asia.83   
These historic events and the apparent U.S. position 
that it supports revolutions in Central Asia has sent 
shockwaves through the remaining states in Central Asia, 
Russia and China.  This change in policy, the statements by 
the SCO calling on the United States to leave the region, 
and the eviction of the United States from Uzbekistan, 
demonstrate that a geopolitical power shift is once again 
occurring in Central Asia, one that is moving away from the 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
U.S. strategy in Central Asia must not be based on the 
premises of the war on terrorism alone.  It must be a 
comprehensive strategy that accounts for all U.S. 
interests.  It is widely believed that terrorism takes its 
roots from economic deprivation, political and domestic 
repression, and overall poverty.  If the United States 
focuses its strategy at the grassroots level and builds up 
from there, it will help address the causes of terrorism 
rather than the symptoms of terrorism.  Based on this 
premise, this paper recommends that the United States 
follow the following prescription in its dealings with 
Central Asia: 
 
1) Support humanitarian, environmental and    
energy assistance; 
2) Support internal reform; 
3) Develop a broader security outlook; 
4) Work with multilateral organizations in Central 
Asia; and 
5) Develop stronger bilateral relations with    
China. 
 
A. SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY 
ASSISSTANCE 
In order to facilitate a change at the grass roots 
level, the United States must demonstrate it is committed 
to helping the people of Central Asia.  The easiest and 
most effective way to do this is to support humanitarian 
aid efforts in each of the countries of Central Asia.  The 
first method for furthering humanitarian aid could be to 
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further utilize organizations such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).  Under 
USAID’s charter for Central Asia, one of its main 
objectives is to increase public access to quality primary 
health care and another is to improve the management of 
critical natural resources in energy.   
The main areas USAID could help in humanitarian 
assistance to Central Asia is by providing medical care, 
medicine, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, medical 
supplies, clothing and food.  Central Asian countries 
suffer from malnutrition, poor health care, expensive 
health care, increasing levels of infectious diseases, 
acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and 
hepatitis.  By combating these factors, USAID can make a 
real difference throughout the region.  At the same time, 
USAID and the U.S. government should advertise this kind of 
help to both the international community and Central Asia.  
If advertised appropriately, it can improve the overall 
image of America in the eyes of the people of Central Asia, 
thereby demonstrating to the people that America is there 
to help, not just to make war. 
In addition to humanitarian assistance, USAID could 
improve the management of critical natural resources and 
energy throughout the region.  At present, Central Asia has 
an abundant supply of natural gas and oil but the 
infrastructure in place is limited and centrally 
controlled.  Where USAID could play a role is in teaching 
those who control the local energy infrastructure how to 
properly manage their resources and educating key managers 
at Western institutions.  Additionally, the system that is 
in place tends to be very corrupt, so teaching the various 
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nations how to reform their own systems so that they will 
run more productively and fairly would help tremendously. 
Unfortunately, USAID’s monetary contributions to the 
region have been minimal.  An example of this poor amount 
is in the case of Kazakhstan where total aid to the country 
for 2005, amounted to 26,690,000 dollars.84  This small 
amount will hardly make a dent in the programs goals it 
supports.  To allow its mission to succeed the United 
States must increase funding to the region. 
Besides USAID, the Department of Defense could 
demonstrate goodwill to the Central Asian states through 
non-military means.  Several options are available, such as 
the conduct of medical capability (MEDCAP) missions 
throughout the region.  Most people think of the military 
as an arm of war and not peace.  By conducting peaceful 
medical missions the United States could build trust 
between itself and the people of Central Asia.  Typical 
MEDCAPs provide free medical care to remote towns and 
villages of a given country.  Providing and advertising 
this free care will help raise the status of the United 
States in the eyes of the people of Central Asia. 
In 2003, total U.S. government assistance in 
humanitarian aid ranged from 0.5 million dollars in 
Turkmenistan to 21.8 million dollars in Tajikistan. This 
assistance included medicines, pharmaceuticals, medical 
supplies, clothing and emergency shelters.85  The problem is 
that this aid has not been uniformly distributed throughout 
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the countries and consists of mostly donated equipment with 
little in the way of direct medical aid.  If the United 
States wants to truly reach the populace, it must 
demonstrate its good will in a fair and comprehensive way.  
Sending doctors to help train and assist local medical 
professionals would go a long way in building up good will 
between the United States and the Central Asian states. 
Besides the United States actively pursuing 
humanitarian aid for Central Asia, it can indirectly 
provide information or assistance to international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) that can directly aid 
the countries of Central Asia.  Good examples of such 
organizations are the Red Cross/Red Crescent, Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch.  What these 
organizations can do is actively identify and pursue 
medical and human rights issues that the United States 
Government can not deal with directly because of political 
concerns.  An example of how the United States can use 
these groups is seen with Human Rights Watch.  Human Rights 
Watch is the largest human rights organization in the 
United States.  This organization conducts fact-finding 
investigations into human rights abuses worldwide.  
Following its investigations it publishes its findings and 
then meets with a country’s governmental agencies in order 
to influence the government to change its policies and fix 
its human rights issues.  The United States can benefit by 
using these findings as leverage against the governments of 
Central Asia, possibly withholding U.S. funds from 
governments who do not follow U.S. policy interests.   
In addition to government influence, the United States 
can also use these INGOs to directly help the citizens of 
Central Asia.  These organizations go beyond what USAID can 
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do.  Where USAID is limited in funds or official backing, 
organizations such as Red Cross/Red Crescent can further 
resolve humanitarian issues in areas where USAID is limited 
in the help it can provide.  In addition, the United States 
could provide assistance to indigenous NGOs, such as the 
Union for Defense of the Aral Sea and Amu Darya, a local 
organization that supports restoring water quality and 
environmental health in the Aral Sea basin.   
The idea behind all of these policy prescriptions in 
humanitarian and environmental support is to further the 
quality of life of the average citizen of Central Asia.  If 
their lives can be improved and their energy and resources 
can be harnessed to improve their overall quality of life, 
the United States will be better able to pursue its own 
interests by gaining the support and backing of the Central 
Asian states and people. 
 
B. SUPPORT FOR INTERNAL REFORM 
In Central Asia as a whole, the largest problem 
affecting the further development of relations between 
these states and the United States is the nature of the 
governments in power.  Each Central Asian state is ruled by 
an authoritarian regime that holds nearly absolute power.  
Based on current policy, in order for the United States to 
fully accept these states they must move towards a more 
democratic form of government.  The easiest way to 
demonstrate the importance of democracy and the positive 
effects it can have on a country are to improve the 
political processes and institutions present in the 
countries of Central Asia. 
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The United States must demonstrate to both the people 
and installed governments the positive effects of 
democracy.  This demonstration has the greatest effect when 
it occurs from the top down.  The prescription presented in 
this paper is that the United States government, through 
the State Department, must take the lead on these 
initiatives.  Currently the State Department is 
concentrating on the war on terrorism and has effectively 
placed democratic reforms as a secondary issue.  But if 
Washington is serious about working with Central Asia, it 
must move forward with its democratic initiatives and 
encourage reform of the governments of Central Asia in a 
comprehensive manner. 
When one looks at Uzbekistan one can see where this 
issue comes to mind.  Since 2001, the United States 
government has stated that in order for Uzbekistan to 
receive continued monetary aid it must demonstrate steps 
towards democratic reform and continue reforms in the way 
of humanitarian issues.  However, Uzbekistan has done 
little, believing that Washington will not push the issue 
because of its need for basing and other assistance in its 
war on terrorism in the region.86  The prescription here is 
that Washington should have enforced a timetable with 
Uzbekistan from the beginning on meeting specific reforms.  
When Uzbekistan failed to follow through the United States 
should have informed Uzbekistan that it would end all aid 
and move its basing to another Central Asian state such as 
Kazakhstan.   
With the recent rioting in Uzbekistan, Washington 
decided it was time to act.  It acted quickly by holding 
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back financial aid, openly denouncing Uzbekistan’s response 
to the demonstrations, and pushed for an international 
investigation into the event.87  The problem with this 
strategy is the United States quickly acted against 
Uzbekistan’s interests shortly after the demonstrations, 
where it had seemingly supported Uzbekistan’s position 
previously.  This forced Tashkent into a position of 
following its national security interest of state stability 
over its bilateral relationship with the United States.  
Tashkent did not expect the United States to take such a 
stance on the issue, as the United States had previously 
demonstrated that it was more concerned with anti-terrorism 
than with democratic reform and human rights.  More 
importantly, the Uzbekistan regime considered these 
demonstrators extremists and as such the United States 
should have supported its position rather than being 
against it.88 
The United States must learn from the Uzbekistan 
experience and conduct its future policies in the region in 
a balanced way, weighing its goals for democratic reform 
with its goals to fight terrorism in the region.  In the 
case of Uzbekistan, the United States must ensure that it 
continues to engage the Uzbekistan government and does not 
let the relationship lapse.  Engagement is the key to 
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dialogue and without it the United States will have little 
influence while China and Russia’s influence will grow, as 
demonstrated in China’s establishment of relations with 
Uzbekistan in March 2005.89 
Based on the deteriorating relationship with 
Uzbekistan, the United States had to readjust its Central 
Asian position and focus its attention on its last strong 
ally in the region, Kyrgyzstan.  In July 2005, Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s prompt visit to Bishkek following the 
declaration by the SCO that the United States should set a 
final timetable for its withdrawal from the region was the 
key to keeping Kyrgyzstan in the U.S. camp; however, with 
this limited victory the United States must not be lax90.  
It must continue Talbott’s overall policy for the region.91  
Democracy and reform will come, but they cannot be rushed.  
Kyrgyzstan’s society, economy, and institutions need 
further growth for democracy to be fully realized.  If 
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democracy is pushed too fast on the bureaucracy in place, 
the will of the people, and the integration between the two 
will collapse and what was a fledgling democracy may turn 
into a protracted civil war as one faction or ethnic group 
fights another for control. 
 
C. DEVELOP A BROADER SECURITY OUTLOOK  
When looking at security in Central Asia the first 
thought that comes to mind is the threat of terrorism.  
Unfortunately, when most Westerners look to terrorism they 
see the symptoms and not the cause.   As such, currently 
U.S. policy is set up to combat the symptom of terrorism 
rather than focusing on the causes of terrorism in Central 
Asia.  As previously discussed, terrorism in Central Asia 
begins with the lowest common denominator, the people.  If 
the United States wants to truly make a difference, it must 
contend with the issue at the grassroots level, where 
terrorism begins. 
Currently, the United States has established bilateral 
relationships with each of the countries of Central Asia, 
setting up information-sharing processes and methods of 
dealing with terrorism that affects the United States and 
that particular country.  The prescription this thesis 
promotes is that the United States must go beyond bilateral 
relationships and focus on the overall threat to the United 
States and the countries of Central Asia.  Experts believe 





repression and overall poverty.92  In the case of Central 
Asia, this is a systemic problem that must be tackled from 
the grass roots level. 
The United States must begin by stopping the financial 
flow that reaches the terrorist organizations and provide 
assistance to raise the social economic level of the 
average Central Asian person so that he or she sees that 
there is another way to better themselves, rather than 
through terrorism.   
Terrorist organizations are like a business.  They 
need funds, workers (terrorists), and a product to sell 
(terrorism).  If the United States can disrupt even one of 
these three, it will likely lessen terrorist actions in the 
region.  Central Asia is the arena from which terrorist 
organizations receive funding through narcotics trafficking 
and where terrorists recruit their volunteers.  Illicit 
drugs are largely produced in Afghanistan and are shipped 
through Central Asia via land routes to Western Europe and 
the Middle East.  An area in which the United States would 
be most effective is in conducting joint military, police, 
and federal training with Central Asian states.  By working 
together and acting on domestic as well as transnational 
issues, the United States will likely be seen more as a 
beneficial actor than as an exploiter.  Funding for these 
kinds of operations could come from Non-Proliferation, 
Anti-Terrorism, De-mining, and related Programs (NADR), 
Freedom Support Act Security Programs, the Central Asian 
Border Security Initiative (CABSI), Community Action  
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Investment Program (CAIP) and USAID; as each of these 
programs provide funding for this kind of training and 
equipment. 
As of 2003, the United States has provided funds to 
foster apolitical, professional militaries capable of 
responding to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian needs 
in the region.  It has provided training in both security 
and law enforcement and has pushed forward with helping the 
Central Asian states in economic and social reform.  In 
2003, funding in these areas was between 8.4 million 
dollars in Turkmenistan to 86.5 million dollars in 
Kazakhstan.93  If the United States wants to make an impact, 
it must allocate more funds in these key areas.  Only 
through education, institution building and bilateral 
contacts with the United States will the countries of 
Central Asia be able to learn more about democracy and 
freedom.  China is currently following this model by 
providing infrastructural investments, public works 
projects and donations of funds to help the region.  If the 
United States wants to be a beneficial force in the region, 
it must match China’s moves there.  If not, China will pull 
ahead and the region will likely become more beholden to 
China than the United States.   
What this policy prescription advises is that the 
United States think beyond the conventional idea of 
external border security and think more in terms of 
regional and domestic security.  As of 2005, each of the 
countries of Central Asia posed no direct threat to each 
other; rather, threats were posed to the countries from 
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internal instability, weak institutions and corrupt 
governments.  To effectively counter this threat each state 
must look inward and as such, so must the United States. 
 
D. COOPERATION WITH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Thus far the policy prescriptions have covered U.S. 
actions in bilateral relationships with the individual 
Central Asian states.  However, as discussed at the 
beginning of this thesis, the United States is new to the 
region and as such is not fully trusted by the people 
living there.  The two established powers in Central Asia 
are China and Russia.  Russia holds the closest ties with 
the countries as a consequence of its direct control over 
them until 1991.  But with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
Russia’s influence has declined.  Russia still has 
influence in the region, but for the most part the 
countries of Central Asia do not want to fall under the 
control of Russia again, and as such are more inclined to 
keep Russia’s influence at a distance. 
China is the newer and more capable complement to 
Russia in the region.  As detailed earlier, since 1991, 
China has played an extensive role in Central Asia.  China 
and Russia established the SCO in order to facilitate 
regional cooperation on a number of mutually beneficial 
issues in the region.  In addition to its role in the SCO, 
China has also established strong bilateral ties with 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan--the three countries 
on China’s border.  If the United States decides to 
unilaterally act on its own interests without trying to 
work with, or even decided to work against China, the 
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possibility exists for failure, animosity, and/or a 
deterioration of US-China ties.   
For the United States the best method of integrating 
itself into a multilateral organization in Central Asia is 
the SCO.  The SCO’s mission parallels the majority of goals 
the United States is working towards in Central Asia.  
Regarding the SCO, its goals are:  
 
1) Strengthening mutual trust and good 
neighborliness and friendship among member 
states; 
2) Developing their effective cooperation in 
political affairs, the economy and trade, 
science and technology, culture, education, 
energy, transportation, environmental 
protection and other fields; 
3) Working together to maintain regional peace, 
security and stability; and 
4) Promoting the creation of a new international 
political and economic order featuring 
democracy, justice and rationality.94 
 
The SCO was created to bring all of the Central Asian 
players together to address regional issues.  Since the 
organization is considered a regional organization, by its 
nature it binds the region into a single body, thereby 
blunting the influence of outside actors such as the United 
States.  To work with the SCO the United States must be 
willing to take small steps.  The likely best step is to 
establish a partnership with the SCO, similar to the 
partnership the SCO has with NATO.95  Through this 
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partnership, the logical first step would be to provide and 
collect intelligence on terrorist organizations operating 
in the SCO’s territory.  This assistance would demonstrate 
that the United States is interested in helping the 
organization and region as a whole without giving the 
appearance that it wants to dominate the region.  Other key 
areas of collaboration could be in law enforcement, counter 
proliferation, and counter narcotics training and 
assistance.  The United States should limit its initial 
help to training and information sharing, as this will 
demonstrate the U.S. willingness to work with, rather than 
lead the SCO.   
The bottom line is that to work with the SCO, the 
United States must be willing to work as an outsider and 
take the slow approach.  China is the key to the SCO, and 
if Beijing is angered or insulted by U.S. unilateral or 
bilateral actions that go contrary to Chinese interests in 
Central Asia, the United States will likely have a much 
harder time collaborating with the countries of Central 
Asia. 
 
E. BUILD STONGER BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA 
On the bilateral front, the United States must 
recognize where its interests converge with China’s and 
where they diverge.  From this comprehensive look at China 
and Central Asia, it can be seen that China is guided by 
three major forces: regional stability, security and 
economic development.  China sees Central Asia as its 
strategic back door, and as such it must maintain a 
positive presence in the region.  If Central Asia were to 
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destabilize due to terrorism, “colored” revolutions and/or 
economic deprivation, it would likely affect China’s 
neighboring Xinjiang Autonomous region.  Xinjiang has 
extensive economic and cultural ties with the region and 
any instability in Xinjiang would in turn disrupt China’s 
national interests of economic modernization and internal 
stability.  For China, if one domino (Xinjiang) were to 
fall, it could lead to internal stability in China’s other 
regions.  This is something China cannot let happen. 
On the positive side, if Beijing is able to help 
stabilize the region through bilateral and multilateral 
relationships, it can strengthen its strategic back door.  
This stability in turn will allow China to invest and 
further develop the region for mutually beneficial needs.  
China is currently the number two oil consumer in the 
world, and it needs to diversify its oil imports in case 
something were to happen to any one of its sources of oil.  
Central Asia provides for this necessity.  Beyond oil needs 
China needs trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia to 
flourish so as to improve the quality of life of Xinjiang’s 
inhabitants.  As detailed earlier, 60 percent of Xinjiang’s 
trade is with Central Asia.  Economic development through 
trade in both Central Asia and Xinjiang can do nothing but 
help China’s position domestically and regionally, and as a 
consequence further stabilize the region. 
The United States wants to secure the area from 
terrorist influences, encourage democratic reform, and 
develop each of the Central Asian states in order to 
integrate them into the global economy.96  The first goal is 
complementary to Beijing’s goals of stability and security 
                     
 96 Lynn Pascoe, “Uzbekistan: The Key to Success in Central Asia” 
68 
in the region.  In this area, both countries have made some 
ground. This was demonstrated when China won recognition of 
its largely internal separatist/terrorist group (the East 
Turkistan Movement) from the United States internationally 
and by the setting up of a permanent FBI office in Beijing 
to coordinate anti-terrorism issues in China in 2002.97  
However, this area of cooperation is limited and can be 
greatly expanded upon.   
Democratic reform is an area on which China and the 
United States do not agree.  Beijing believes that each 
country should follow its own path to development and that 
no outside country should interfere in that development.  
Because of recent events in Kyrgyzstan, China is now very 
wary of U.S. actions in support of democratic reform in the 
region.  China sees reform as a destabilizing force that 
can cause a government to collapse and/or economic 
development to be hindered.  In order for trade to flourish 
and stability to be retained, the Central Asian states must 
be allowed to reform their governments at their own pace; 
otherwise chaos and instability will result.98 
Where the United States and China could work together 
in regards to democratic reforms is in the area of economic 
development in each of the Central Asian States.  It is a 
commonly held belief by political scientists that economic 
prosperity can lead to democratization.  The model based on 
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this observation is the developmental state.  Based on this 
model, it is commonly held that a government that pushes 
for economic prosperity through industrial and economic 
development will endeavor to develop full market economies.  
In turn, this market economy requires sound institutions 
that will further the countries direction towards 
capitalism, and from capitalism the state may move toward 
democratization.99 
If the United States further develops the region, it 
will lead to economic prosperity and as a likely result, 
the Central Asian states may move more toward democratic 
governments.  As an additional benefit, the United States 
may check China’s growing economic influence by furthering 
U.S. investments in the countries of the region.  Overall 
economic prosperity is a goal for both nations, so in this 
area both China and the United States could work together 
to bring economic development to the region.   
On the other hand, if the United States decides to 
push forward with democratic reforms by supporting 
revolutionary groups or governments, this will likely cause 
deterioration in U.S.-China ties and possibly lead to U.S. 
alienation by both China and the Central Asian states, and 
as a result, lead to closer ties between the two.  The 
United States should move forward on all three fronts 
comprehensively, rather than favoring one interest over 
another. 
Understanding China’s motives and interests in Central 
Asia will allow the United States to make sound policy 
decisions when it takes actions in the region.  Recently, 
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events in Uzbekistan have had negative consequences as the 
United States has taken the hard line approach to politics 
in the region by encouraging the perception that it is more 
in favor of democratic reforms than anti-terrorism and 
economic development.  To diminish this perception, The 
United States should back off of its confrontational 
posture and instead follow China’s example in the region.  
It should demonstrate its great power status by helping to 
develop the region economically and work with the states in 
a positive direction by helping the states through the SCO 
in antiterrorism and antinarcotics operations.  China 
currently has the advantage in the region, but things do 
not have to remain this way.  Engagement is the key to 
unlocking the region, and the United States should ensure 
that it works in positive ways on the multilateral front as 
well as the bilateral front in its future dealings with 
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